Plotting a roadmap through the constitutional issues, and setting the situation in its historical context, this June 2017 briefing paper highlights and explains key parliamentary dates, events and procedures that shape the process of forming and sustaining a minority government, focusing on the 2017 case.
The fundamental principle at the heart of our parliamentary democracy is that the government must command the confidence of the House of Commons. In the event of a hung Parliament, where no party secures an outright majority, the arithmetic presents politicians with a conundrum: who commands MPs' confidence, and should therefore govern?
The answer to this question is determined through a complex nexus of constitutional conventions, laws and precedents, party political calculations and gauging of the public mood. Guidance and rules exist to help resolve who should govern, including in the form of the Cabinet Manual and the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act.
This June 2017 briefing paper addresses how a government is formed and then sustained in office when the House of Commons is hung, focusing on the 2017 situation. It also looks at how a minority government might operate in Parliament, focusing on the impact it may have on parliamentary process and procedure.
Historical comparisons and precedents
What does 'command confidence' mean?
The incumbent Prime Minister: stay or go?
When will Parliament meet?
The State Opening of Parliament: will the Queen attend?
The Queen's Speech debate: confidence of the House?
Will there be a second general election?
What difference does the Fixed Term Parliaments Act make?
Seats vs votes: what counts?
An alternative party leader / Prime Minister?
How long can be taken to form a government?
Does it matter if votes are lost?
What about the House of Lords?
Will minority government mean less legislation?
Will the Speaker's casting vote influence decisions?
Managing time: potential problems ahead
The establishment and composition of select committees
The fiscal maze
Delegated legislation: an increase in deferrals and withdrawals?
Accountability and transparency
The Rwanda Bill has made it over the parliamentary finishing line but not without some last-minute drama. We talk to the SNP’s Alison Thewliss MP about what went on in a small room, behind the Speaker’s Chair, away from the cameras!
To mark the Hansard Society’s 80th anniversary we are launching the Churchill-Attlee Democracy Lecture in honour of our first members, Winston Churchill and Clement Attlee. The inaugural lecture will be given by former Prime Minister the Rt Hon Theresa May MP. This is a fundraising event for our 80th Anniversary Appeal. Date & location: Tuesday 14 May 2024, 7:00-8:15pm, Westminster (venue to be announced) Tickets: £25
With a general election on the horizon there has been a spate of new legislation and regulations to implement changes to the way the election will be run, with consequences for voters and electoral administrators. Parliament has not always had a role in approving these changes. This briefing sets out the core changes to the electoral process that have been implemented since the last general election in 2019, the role that Parliament has played in scrutinising and approving them, and the risks arising from these changes.
The Climate Change Act 2008 established a framework for setting carbon budgets every five years. But the role of Parliament in approving these budgets has been widely criticised, including by the Prime Minister. The Environmental Audit Committee has proposed improvements in the scrutiny process to ensure effective climate action, particularly in the context of the UK’s commitment to achieving 'Net Zero' emissions by 2050. These reforms will significantly alter the way Parliament handles the Seventh Carbon Budget in 2025.
The Government’s flagship Tobacco and Vapes Bill will ban the sale of tobacco to anyone born after 2009. The genesis of the delegated powers in the Bill – dating back a decade - tells an important story about the way in which incomplete policy-making processes are used by Ministers to seek ‘holding’ powers in a Bill, only for that precedent to then be used to justify further, broader powers in subsequent Bills. This ‘creeping’ effect in the legislative process undermines parliamentary scrutiny of ministerial action.
